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ABSTRACT 
Retention is a key readiness factor in US Army Reserve units. This initial report 
develops an integrative, conceptual model of retention in Troop Program Units (TPU's) 
that highlights the role of TPU leadership. It describes three qualitatively different 
decision processes involved in soldiers' decision to remain in TPU's—economic, 
psychological, and sociological. Based on a review of prior research on attrition/ 
retention in the US Army Reserve, it identifies five sets of favorable unit conditions 
that influence unit retention via those decision processes-timely pay/benefits 
administration, satisfying training, unit cohesion, trust in leaders, and support from 
employer and spouse. It proposes that the creation of these favorable conditions be 
considered key leadership goals for TPU commanders, and outlines the next stage of 
the research program, which will identify specific leader behaviors that build these 
favorable conditions. 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
Units in the US Army Reserve are a major factor in fighting and winning in the 
battlefield. As the primary provider of combat service support units for the Army and a major 
provider of combat support, it is essential that USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU) readiness be 
maintained at the highest possible levels. 
TPU leadership is the key element in formulating a reserve program that is a robust and 
viable member of the Total Army team. Currently, leadership factors which positively influence 
unit readiness have not been identified. One of the primary factors affecting unit readiness is 
the turbulence caused by poor drill attendance and retention. The problem then remains to 
identify leadership practices/policies which are not easily measured and to understand how they 
are related to TPU attrition/attendance. 
This initial report provides a conceptual model, or framework, for determining the effects 
of leadership upon USAR TPU readiness, as measured through enlisted attendance and retention. 
The purpose of the framework, in turn, is to provide the baseline or foundation for the follow-on 
portions of the research project. 
A.       Sources of Information 
The primary source for this report was the existing research literature on 
retention/attrition in USAR units. This information was supplemented with more general 
research on motivation, turnover, and leadership as needed. However, the intent was to remain 
grounded, as far as possible, in information related to the specific context of the USAR. To 
further this intent, interviews were conducted with a number of officers and enlisted personnel 
in the USAR, and TPU's were observed during drill weekends. 
Enlisted attrition rates are sizeable in the USAR, and have remained so despite 
a number of programs and policy changes. High attrition (low retention) rates, in turn, are of 
concern because they introduce a turbulence that impairs TPU readiness. High turnover of 
personnel in units makes it more difficult for TPU commanders to achieve their readiness goals. 
At any point in time, there are apt to be a number of positions that are unfilled. When new 
personnel are obtained, they need training or, in the case of many prior service personnel, 
retraining-so that they are unable to carry their full load of responsibilities initially and the unit 
must spend more of its scarce training time going over basic, rather than advanced, content. 
In addition, the ongoing turnover of personnel disrupts working relationships in the unit, creating 
confusion and the need to rebuild trust and renegotiate responsibilities and understandings 
regarding how things are done in the unit. These problems are especially important for those 
early-deploying TPU's in the Critical Force Pool (CFP)-those units most likely to be called up 
for active duty on short notice. 
High attrition is also financially costly to the USAR. The GAO (1991) has 
calculated that it costs approximately $40,000 to recruit and train each soldier. Increased 
retention rates would thus result in the savings of large sums, which could be invested in 
upgraded training and equipment, and full-time staff-areas which appear to have significant 
impact on unit readiness. 
C.       Overview of Attrition/Retention Research In the USAR 
The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive review, but rather 
to characterize general features of the existing research literature on attrition in the US Army 
3 
Reserve.1   Laurence, Naughton and Harris (1995) note that the largest body of research on 
attrition in the US military in general has involved attempts to identify personal characteristics 
of individuals who are most likely to complete their enlistment term.   In the case of the US 
Army Reserve, this research has identified such factors as high school graduation, higher mental 
abilities, race, gender, and some personality variables. This research has been performed mainly 
by economists using existing data bases maintained by DoD.   As Perry, Griffith and White 
(1991) note, economists have tended to approach this research with traditional economic 
assumptions of a rational actor who weighs economic costs and benefits of joining and remaining 
in the US AR.  Thus, these researchers have also emphasized the effects of economic incentives 
in attracting and retaining soldiers.  Taken as a whole, this body of research has been directed 
at improved recruiting and selection policies—for screening potentially high-quality enlistees and 
providing them with sufficient incentives to attain recruiting quotas. 
Perry et al. (1991) note that there is also a body of research that focuses on how 
reservists' role conflicts contribute to attrition. In this research, attrition may be triggered by 
conflicts between reserve activities and reservists' responsibilities to their primary civilian 
employers and to their families. Role conflict is a sociological concept, and based upon 
motivational assumptions quite distinct from those of economics (as explained below). Yet, on 
the whole, attrition research in the US AR dealing with role conflicts has not fully developed 
these assumptions. Often, these conflicts have simply been added as additional variables in 
primarily economic analyses. 
Finally, there is also a body of research that explains attrition in terms of 
■"■For a more detailed review of attrition research in the US 
military, see Laurence, Naughton, and Harris (1995). 
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conditions that reservists encounter within their Troop Program Units (TPU's).   McGovern 
(1983), for example, concluded that, although pay and bonuses might attract reservists, they 
were not sufficient to retain them if they were seriously dissatisfied with unit activities.  Much 
of this research, then, deals with the psychological satisfactions and dissatisfactions of TPU 
membership, and conditions within the unit that create them.   In the late 1980's, the Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducted a number of survey studies 
on attrition in the USAR that measured a number of such variables (e.g., Bray & Theisen, 1990; 
Nogami, Home & Hydock, 1988).  Table 1 summarizes results from one such study, involving 
over 2,000 attritees (Bray & Theisen, 1990).  As shown in that table, attritees reported that the 
three most important reasons for stopping drill attendance involved dissatisfactions with factors 
internal to the unit—with unit training activities, unit administration, and unit leaders.   More 
recently, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) has sponsored survey studies involving 
such factors, performed first by Westat, Inc. (summarized in Perry, Griffith & White, 1991) and 
currently by Amerind.   (Results from these studies will be summarized below.) 
This latter body of research on satisfactions/dissatisfactions within the unit directs 
attention to the role of leadership in attrition, since the unit commander is accountable for 
conditions within the TPU and has significant influence over them.  The GAO (1991) reported 
senior Reserve officials' beliefs that ineffective unit leadership and poor training were major 
factors contributing to attrition.   The importance of leadership is also supported by the wide 
variation in attrition across units performing similar functions (Laurence et al.,   1995). 
Nevertheless, there has been very little systematic research on TPU leadership as a source of 
attrition. Part of the problem is that previous research on attrition has been conducted using the 
TABLE 1.   MAIN REASONS STATED BY ATTRITEES FOR 
STOPPING DRILLING BEFORE COMPLETION OF OBLIGATION 
33% Dissatisfaction, with unit training activities 
29% Dissatisfaction with unit admin, (pay, records, etc.) 
28% Dissatisfaction with unit leaders 
23% Difficulties related to civilian job 
21 % Conflicts with family needs/plans 
19% Transportation difficulties 
19% Decreased personal motivation 
12% Time it took from other activities 
10% Conditions related to health/fitness 
8% Difficulties with school requirements 
Source:    Bray and Theisen, 1990. 
Figures shown:    % choosing a reason as most important or second most important (Questions 8, 9). 
Figures sum to 200%. 
individual reservist as the unit of analysis, using random samples of reservists from different 
units. Almost no research has used the TPU as the level of analysis, and looked at leadership 
and other conditions within a TPU that account for differences in attrition levels between units. 
A major exception is a qualitative study by McGovern (1983) of ten reserve 
companies showing different levels of unit attrition. Another exception involves ongoing work 
by the staff of the Readiness Office, Critical Force Pool, US Army Reserve Command (Headley, 
1995). This effort identifies units with attrition levels above 40 percent, uses survey and 
interview data to identify problem areas within the unit, and feeds the data back to unit 
6 
commanders. However, this effort is more a diagnostic/counselling intervention than a research 
program.  There is a clear need for more unit-level research, consistent with the GAO's (1991) 
recommendation of increased attention to unit-level attrition. 
D.       TKe Approach Taken Here 
While building on the findings of earlier studies involving leadership and 
retention/attrition in the US AR, the present project is different in two fundamental ways. First, 
it focuses on leadership and retention at the TPÜ level.   For simplicity, it focuses on the role 
of a company commander, since most CFP units are of company size.  Interviews also suggest 
that leadership is especially important in shaping retention at the company level, where the 
commander has sufficient authority to set policies and take disciplinary actions, but the command 
is also small enough so that the commander is visible to all soldiers.  The approach taken here, 
then, is to try to understand those aspects of the company commander's role that have a 
significant effect on unit retention. 
Second, the goal is to develop a comprehensive model or framework. The intent 
is not simply to identify a list of variables that shape retention.  Rather, the effort is to develop 
an underlying model of leadership and retention/attrition that helps explain why those variables 
influence retention.    Toward this end, the model attempts to integrate a diverse set of 
assumptions from different social science disciplines about why people choose to leave units. 
Rather than choosing one set of assumptions (e.g., economic), or being atheoretical, the strategy 
has been to build an integrative model that combines diverse causal dynamics into one model that 
is still simple enough to understand. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
Figure 1 shows the main elements of the TPU leadership/retention model developed here 
as the foundation for the overall project. The major path of causality assumed in the model is 
via the arrows running from left to right in the figure. However, it is easiest to understand the 
logic of the model by discussing these elements in reverse order. The outcome that the model 
seeks to explain is the enlisted retention rate in a TPU. Working backwards, retention is the 
immediate outcome of soldiers' decision processes. Here, the model spells out qualitatively 
different decision dynamics which appear to contribute to the decision to remain or leave. 
Understanding these basic decision-making dynamics, in turn, allows us to identify unit 
conditions affecting retention. These are the conditions in the TPU that matter to soldiers-that 
enter into their decision making. In the model, then, TPU commanders with highest retention 
rates are those who succeed in creating favorable unit conditions. Again working backwards, 
the model tries to identify leadership behaviors that tend to contribute to those favorable 
conditions. The model also recognizes that situational factors (such as the type and location of 
the unit) shape unit conditions as well, making it easier or more difficult to reduce attrition 
across different units. Finally, the model also includes feedback effects from unit retention to 
many of the unit conditions, so that the conditions which foster high or low retention can create 
self-reinforcing cycles. 
III. ENLISTED RETENTION RATE 
The intent of the model is to determine what influences reservists to remain in the unit. 
For that reason, the term "retention" is used here (rather than attrition). This term is used in 
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reenlistment at the end of that contract. 
Briefly, TPU's make up the Selected Reserve-that part of the Ready Reserve made up 
of units organized for mobilization and deployment. The remainder of the Ready Reserve is the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)-a pool of individuals available to augment both Active and 
Reserve units. When individuals join the US AR, they contract for an eight-year Military Service 
Obligation-typically three to six years in TPU's (i.e., the Selected Reserve) for non-prior 
service reservists, with the balance of the enlistment to be served in the IRR. Reservists can 
reenlist when their terms of service in a TPU are up. 
The GAO (1991) noted that, in the Reserves, only one in five non-prior service reservists 
tends to complete his/her enlistment. Of those who complete their enlistment, more than half 
reenlist. Although a significant amount of attrition occurs during basic training, the model is 
concerned with reservists who have completed basic training and joined their TPU. These 
individuals are required to attend drill weekends (once a month) and two weeks of annual 
training. Drill weekends are divided into four or five four-hour drills. When reservists miss 
nine or more drills, they are deemed to be nonparticipating, and are administratively reassigned 
to the IRR. Thus, no legal sanctions are imposed to enforce reservists' contracts, and reservists 
are relatively free to walk away from the unit. 
Much attrition, then, is due to the unprogrammed loss of reservists who, of their own 
volition, simply stop participating in training. Other reasons for leaving include unsatisfactory 
performance, medical problems, and hardships. However, it is the level of the former, 
manageable or preventable, attrition in the TPU which the model is designed to account for.2 
2For difficulties in identifying precise reasons for attrition 
from existing data, see GAO (1991) and Lawrence et al. (1995). 
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IV.      SOLDIERS' DECISION PROCESSES 
Three qualitatively different processes seem to be involved in soldiers' decisions to 
remain in the USAR. Each process can be viewed as generating a motivational force to remain, 
and the forces produced by the three processes appear to be additive.3   Each process seems 
especially useful for describing different aspects of reservists' decisions to remain in a TPU. 
This process is central to economic assumptions about retention behavior. It 
involves a rational analysis of an investment or exchange of goods within the context of larger 
markets. The reservist is deciding whether to continue investing his marketable time and labor 
in return for valuable benefits received (including pay, educational and other benefits, and 
marketable skill training). 
This sort of decision making is sometimes called "rational-instrumental." Staying 
with a TPU has value to the extent that it is believed to be instrumental in producing superior 
outcomes for the reservist. Those outcomes can be understood as extrinsic rewards given to the 
reservist in exchange for his/her continued participation. "Rationality" is defined in terms of 
picking the behavior (staying or leaving) that has the highest expected return. By itself, this 
decision process produces only an "instrumental" relationship between the reservist and the 
USAR.   That is, membership is valued only in terms of its usefulness (instrumentality) in 
3These insights build upon the work of Fishbein (1963; Aj zen 
& Fishbein, 1980) , as well as Triandis (1971; 1977) . Both 
researchers have proposed predictive models of behavior that 
incorporate calculative (expectancy) dynamics and normative 
reasoning. In addition, Triandis incorporates habit strength. For 
a review of both models and an application to reenlistment in the 
US Army National Guard, see Horn (197 7). 
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producing economic value for the reservist. 
This decision process influences the reservist to remain in the reserves as long as 
the exchange appears to be beneficial to the reservist-benefits outweigh costs, and no other 
competing use of time appears more rewarding. The reservist will be more likely to leave the 
unit when pay and benefits are reduced or not delivered, when travel time or other costs of 
participation increase (including costs with respect to family and primary job), when quality job 
skills are not received, or when a more potentially rewarding job presents itself. 
B.       Psychological (Calculative or Reinforcement) 
Like economic decision making, this decision process involves valued outcomes. 
However, this dynamic involves intangible, psychological rewards obtained directly from TPU 
participation. These rewards are intrinsic to TPU participation-that is, they are psychological 
satisfactions stemming directly from TPU activities. One key area here involves intrinsic 
rewards from the work tasks (training) performed during drills and annual training. 
The satisfactions received from unit membership can enter into the rational, 
calculative decision process described above. This sort of deliberate calculation seems to be 
especially likely to occur at major choice points, such as the decision to join, or to reenlist at 
the end of the reservist's contract.4 Here, a soldier, stopping to think logically, might factor in 
these psychological rewards, along with economic rewards, to make the decision. However, 
these satisfactions can also operate through a less rational reinforcement process. "Decisions" 
reached in this manner are not based on logical calculation of future rewards from TPU 
4See Horn's (1979) speculation on this point, to explain why 
cognitive models he tested were especially effective in explaining 
reenlistment decisions in the National Guard. 
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membership as much as on the accumulated emotional effects of past experiences with the unit— 
and may operate without the reservist stopping to think about it.  Much attrition occurs before 
expiration of the reservist's obligation, when reservists simply miss more drills than are 
permitted.   Interviews suggested that junior enlisteds who began missing drills, in fact, often 
found that attrition had simply somehow "happened." 
Viewed from a reinforcement perspective, the "decision" to attend TPU drills 
from month to month can be viewed as a habit that can vary in strength for reservists.  At any 
point in time, the habit has been strengthened (reinforced) by positive experiences that the 
reservist has received from past drill attendance,  and has been weakened by negative 
experiences.   When the habit is strong, the reservist will tend to come despite obstacles, feel 
positive about attending, and have a great deal of emotional energy for the drill. When the habit 
is weak, the reservist will tend to feel unenthusiastic about drill attendance, and relatively minor 
obstacles (e.g., trouble arranging transportation or child care) or temptations can interfere with 
it. 
Co       Sociological (Normative) 
The two previous processes shape the decision to remain in a TPU on the basis 
of its positive outcomes for reservists—either anticipated benefits (in the economic process) or 
past reinforcements (in the psychological process). In contrast, the sociological process involves 
reservists' thinking about the moral or ethical "rightness" of the act of remaining—of what they 
"should" do.  This type of thinking is called "normative" (e.g., Fishbein, 1963). This decision 
process, then, involves standards of behavior to which individuals hold themselves and each 
other. 
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As described by Fishbein (1963; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), normative thinking 
involves considering how individuals or groups that one values would view the correctness of 
a given action.   The individual is most likely to follow a given course of action when it is 
regarded as normatively desirable by "reference" groups (or individuals) whom the individual 
most strongly values and respects. 
In the case of TPU retention, reservists consider the views of some reference 
people or groups outside the TPU, including employers and spouses. However, important 
normative forces also develop within the TPU. The unit is likely to develop its own standards 
regarding drill attendance, for example. The more cohesive the unit becomes, the more effect 
those norms tend to have upon the behavior of unit members. In a highly cohesive unit with 
standards of high attendance, absenteeism may be viewed as disloyal, irresponsible, 
unprofessional, letting down the unit, and so on. For reservists who have been in the USAR 
or the active Army for lengthy periods, those standards are likely to become internalized as 
personal standards, through a process of socialization. 
Normative standards apply both ways, however, in the sense that reservists also 
hold unit leadership to normative standards. Here, one can think of a kind of normative 
"contract" (e.g., Rousseau, 1995) between reservists and leaders. The TPU leadership builds 
trust and respect by treating reservists fairly, living up to its own standards, looking out for the 
welfare of reservists, and so on. In contrast, if reservists feel that TPU leadership has violated 
its end of this normative contract, then reservists appear less likely to feel obligated to live up 
to their end. If the violation is severe enough, and the standards internalized, it may cause some 
reservists to leave the unit-possibly to find another unit whose leadership will honor the 
14 
contract. 
V.       UNIT CONDITIONS AFFECTING RETENTION 
This portion of the framework identifies those conditions within a TPU that appear most 
likely to influence retention levels.   Drawing upon past retention/attrition research, conditions 
are identified that seem most important in terms of each of the three decision processes 
mentioned above. Some conditions, like promotions, may be involved in more than one process. 
For simplicity, however, each condition is listed only under the process in which it appears to 
play the strongest role. 
Economic factors are clearly an important reason for reservists to join the USAR. 
Gorman and Thomas (1989, table A-l) performed a factor analysis of non-prior service enlistees' 
responses to questions about enlistment reasons on the 1987 New Recruit Survey. The analysis 
identified four factors: personal development (being all you can be), career development (skill- 
building for civilian jobs), the meaningfulness of being a soldier (service to country, etc.), and 
money/fringe benefits. Of these four, career development and money/fringe benefits are most 
clearly related to economics. Table 2 shows reservists' designation of the most important reason 
for joining the USAR on the 1994 Survey of TPU Soldiers (Amerind, 1994). Although "serve 
my country" is on average cited most frequently (except for junior enlisted), the three next most 
frequently cited reasons are economic. Earning extra money is frequently cited across all grade 
levels. Earning Montgomery GI Bill benefits is exceptionally important among junior enlisteds. 
Expanding civilian career opportunities is somewhat less often cited. 
Nevertheless,  once reservists join and begin participating in unit activities, 
15 
TABLE 2.   MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR JOINING THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE, 
FROM 1994 SURVEY OF TPU SOLDIERS 
% of  Soldiers  Rating Reason 
Reasons "Most   Important"  
Jr.   Enl.      Jr.   NCOs Sr.   NCOs 
Earn  extra money 16                   27 2 8 
Earn Mont.   GI  Bill  benefits 22                    10 2 
Expand civilian  career opportunities 9                      7 6 
Serve my  country 19                    2 8 33 
Become more mature,   self-reliant 8                       3 2 
Keep   in good physical   condition 10 0 
Be   challenged by military  training 10                       5 5 
Develop  leadership  qualities 2                      3 4 
Gain  self-discipline 12 0 
Other 13                    15 19 
Source:  Amerind, 1994.  Answers to Question T18. 
economic factors appear to become less important or less clearcut (i.e., more diluted) in the 
decision to stay or leave. Other psychological and social factors are introduced into the 
reservists' experiences. For example, the economic benefits of career preparation become 
realized (or not) through training activities, which introduce their own psychological satisfactions 
or dissatisfactions. This training, moreover, is also a way for the reservist to realize non- 
economic goals of personal development and becoming a good soldier. Thus, there is no 
clearcut evidence that reservists' dissatisfactions with training are tied primarily to economics 
of career development.  In this report, therefore, adequacy of training is discussed primarily as 
16 
a psychological factor. 
Two other considerations seem important to understanding the role of economic 
factors for TPU leadership. First, company commanders are extremely restricted in ability to 
alter or augment the terms of the economic agreement between the reservist and the USAR--that 
is, to offer new economic rewards. Rather, they are in charge of administering or executing that 
agreement. So, in terms of economic factors, TPU leadership seems to shape attrition primarily 
in terms of how well, and how fairly, it executes economic matters like pay and promotions. 
Attrition reasons surrounding promotions (or their lack), in particular, appear to arise from 
perceptions of unfairness—a normative issue—and will therefore be discussed under sociological 
factors involving trust, below. 
Timely pay and benefits administration stands out as an economic factor 
influenced by the TPU. The GAO (1991) notes that delayed pay and benefits have been a 
continuing problem, as indicated by past survey studies of reservists. In the 1994 Survey of 
TPU Soldiers (Amerind, 1994), 35% of junior enlisted stated that pay problems would contribute 
a great deal to their leaving the TPU. Table 3 shows the results of a predictive analysis of 
attrition conducted by Westat, based on data from the 1988 and 1989 data from the Survey of 
TPU Soldiers (Perry, Griffith and White, 1991). Survey data from 1988 were used to predict 
reservists' stated intentions to leave before their contracted date, and also to predict whether 
reservists had actually attritted by the time of the 1989 survey. In that study, receiving monthly 
pay on time was one of the three top predictors of actual leaving/ staying. Although pay and 
benefits problems can also have their source outside the unit in "downstream" paperwork, many 
of these problems are seen by reservists as being caused within the unit.   As shown earlier in 
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TABLE 3.   VARIABLES PREDICTING ATTRITION (AND INTENTION 
TO ATTRIT) IN THE WESTAT STUDY 
Economic Factors 
* Receiving monthly pay on time 
Psychological Factors 
Training: 
Opportunity to use military skills during weekend drill 
Recognition and rewards are done well 
(Chance to develop desired job skills in USAR) 
(Opportunity to develop leadership skills) 
(Importance of soldier's work to unit) 
(Opportunity to find an enjoyable job in USAR) 
Sociological Factors 
Unit Cohesion: 
* Sense of belonging to USAR 
* Sense of belonging to unit 
Sense of unit as family 
(Personal meaning of USAR) 
(Pride in Army Reserve participation) 
Trust in Leaders: 
Trust and confidence in officers 
Unit commander viewed as helpful 
Platoon leader viewed as helpful 
Squad leader viewed as helpful 
(Immediate supervisor looks out for solder's welfare) 
(First Sgt. viewed as helpful) 
Promotions handled fairly in USAR 
Role Conflicts: 
Absence for annual training a problem for employer 
Civilian job supervisor attitude to USAR participation 
(Spouse attitude toward participation in USAR) 
(Weekend drill absences a problem for family) 
Miscellaneous: 
Orientation to unit mission done well at in-processing 
Introduction to chain-of-command done well at in-processing 
* Best discriminating variable for leavers vs. stayers 
(Significant predictors of stated intent to leave, but not of actual leaving). 
Source:  Adapted from Perry, Griffith and White (1991).   Excludes demographic variables.  Combines 
results from their Tables 1 through 4.   Headings have been added. 
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Table 1, a sample of attritees rated dissatisfaction with unit administration (of pay, records, etc.) 
as one of the three most important reasons why they had left the Army Reserve. 
Intrinsic rewards from work tasks have been found to be important predictors of 
employee turnover in civilian organizations. Likewise, job redesign interventions to "enrich" 
those jobs have proven effective in reducing turnover.5 In the USAR, however, all work 
performed in the TPU is considered training (unless it is mobilized). So attrition research 
involving work tasks has been examined in terms of training. 
As shown in Table 1, dissatisfaction with unit training activities was most 
frequently cited by attritees as their reason for leaving the USAR in the 1988 TPU Attritee 
Research Project (Bray & Theisen, 1990). The GAO (1991) noted that dissatisfaction with 
training has been primarily restricted to weekend drills (inactive duty training), rather than 
annual training or active duty. 
Some dissatisfaction comes from degraded training—that is, inability to conduct 
planned training. In the focus group study conducted by Nogami and Home (1988), several 
related factors emerged: lack of equipment, lack of training areas, and lack of constructive 
activities during drills. In Unit Retention Evaluations conducted on high-attrition TPU's by the 
US Army Recruiting Command (Headley, 1995), training disorganization was a frequent theme- 
training plans changed at the last minute, equipment not available for the new plan, and soldiers 
forced to spend long periods waiting. 
Other dissatisfaction seems to come from the nature of that training which is 
5For a review of the effects of job redesign or job enrichment 
interventions, see McEvoy & Cascio (1985) . 
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conducted.   Attritees in the 1988 TPU Attrition Project were especially likely to characterize 
their training as "boring" (Bray & Theisen, 1990).   Likewise, "uninteresting" training showed 
up as an attrition factor in the Nogami and Home (1988) study.   The Westat analysis also 
identified opportunity to find an "enjoyable" job in the US AR as a factor that predicted staying 
vs leaving (Perry, Griffith & White, 1991). 
Words like boring, uninteresting and enjoyable are general evaluations of the 
satisfaction obtained from training. For diagnostic purposes, it seems important to provide more 
information on what it takes to make training satisfying. Other research results provide insight 
into the more specific features of training that contribute to this overall evaluation. Here, I will 
use a model of intrinsic task rewards developed by Thomas and Tymon (1993; 1994; Thomas 
& Velthouse, 1990) to organize those specifics. That model identifies four experiences from 
work tasks that are intrinsically rewarding (satisfying): a sense of choice, of competence, of 
meaningfulness, and of progress. 
Choice is the feeling that one is doing what one wants to do and in ways that 
make sense. The GAO (1991) observed that a major factor in attrition was assigning duties to 
reservists that did not match the MOS area they had chosen. Similarly, not liking ones reserve 
duties emerged as an attrition factor in the Nogami and Home (1988) study. 
Competence is the feeling that one is performing ones task activities skillfully, 
demonstrating abilities. In the Westat analysis (Table 3), the opportunity to use military skills 
during weekend drills was a significant predictor of actual staying vs. leaving. In addition, the 
chance to develop desired job skills, and the opportunity to develop leadership skills, were 
significantly related to the reservist's stated intention to stay vs. leave. 
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Meaningfulness is the feeling that one's work serves a worthwhile purpose—that 
one's work can make a valuable difference.   In the Westat findings (Table 3), the importance 
of the soldier's work to the unit was a significant predictor to his/her stated intention to stay vs. 
leave. 
Progress is the feeling that one is actually achieving the task purpose—that the task 
is really moving forward and one's efforts are accomplishing something.   Progress can be 
apparent to soldiers themselves and can also be reinforced through feedback and recognition 
from others.  In the Westat findings, the perception that recognition and rewards were handled 
well in the unit was a significant predictor of staying vs. leaving. 
C,       Sociological Factors 
Role conflicts with civilian employers and with the family were identified as major 
retention/attrition factors by Grissmer & Kirby (1985) and constituted two of the four major 
causes of attrition mentioned by USAR unit focus groups in 1988 (Nogami & Home, 1988).6 
Although important, there is also some evidence that their influence has been overemphasized. 
Table 4 shows relevant results from the 1994 Survey of TPU Soldiers (Amerind, 1994). As the 
table shows, senior enlisteds and officers tend to overestimate the importance of support by 
spouse and employer on the attrition of junior enlisteds, as compared with ratings of importance 
by the junior enlisteds themselves.   In the Westat study (Perry et al., 1991), likewise, spouse 
and employer support contributed a very modest  amount to predicting reservists' intention to 
6Role conflicts with employer and spouse, strictly speaking, are not 
unit conditions, since they occur outside the unit. How-ever, they are 
included here because they are not totally outside the influence of the 
TPU commander. A number of units reported using outreach efforts to try 
to have spouses and civilian employers of reservists participate in some 
unit functions--to win their support. 
21 
TABLE 4. MISPERCEPTIONS OF FACTORS IN JUNIOR ENLISTED 
ATTRITION (1994 SURVEY OF TPU SOLDIERS) 
% Saying Factor Would Contribute 
A Great Deal to Jr. Enlisted At- 
trition 
Overestimated Factors 
Lack of employer support 














Lack of equal opportunity due 
to racial discrimination        37 
Lack of equal opportunity due 
to gender discrimination 
Not being treated with respect 
Not being treated fairly 
Poor officer leadership 
Officers don't care about 
enlisted soldiers 
Poor advancement opportunities 
for military skill training 
Source: 1994 Survey of Troop Program Unit Soldiers (Amerind, 1994). First column shows percent 
of junior enlisted rating each item as "would contribute a great deal" to their decision to leave Army 
Reserve (Question 51). Second column shows percent of all others rating each item as "contributes 
a great deal" to junior enlisted soldiers leaving the Army Reserve (Question 50). Of the 24 items, only 
those showing a response difference of 10 percent or more are shown here. 
34 14 +20 
51 31 +20 
47 28 + 19 
44 30 + 14 
41 29 + 12 
39 28 + 11 
attrit-adding only two percent to explained variance (from an R2 of .17 to .19). 
Trust in leaders, on the other hand, has been underestimated as an influence on 
attrition. As shown in Table 4, senior enlisteds and officers underestimated the importance of 
a number of items that seem to capture aspects of their own trustworthiness. Not being treated 
fairly and respectfully by leaders, and not being cared about by leaders, seem generally to get 
at issues of trust and trustworthiness of leadership. In more general terms, they imply that 
leaders have violated the implicit normative contract that reservists have with TPU leaders. The 
Westat results  (Table  3)  likewise  show  that a  number of items  related  to  leadership 
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trustworthiness predicted actual staying vs. leaving.    These items include general trust and 
confidence in officers, fair handling of promotions, and the perceived helpfulness of the entire 
chain of command within the company. 
Unit cohesion measures emerged in the Westat analysis (Table 3) as two of the 
three strongest predictors of attrition.   The sense of belonging to the U.S. Army Reserves and 
to the unit were strongly predictive of actual staying vs. leaving.   The sense of the unit as a 
family also predicted staying.   Among the sociological factors, then, unit cohesion appears to 
have a comparatively strong influence on retention/ attrition.  The central role of unit cohesion 
in attrition was also apparent in McGovern's (1983) qualitative study of TPU's with high and 
low attrition.  Likewise, attritees in the 1988 TPU Attrition Project tended to rate "I never felt 
like I belonged to the Unit" as an important reason why they stopped attending drills (Bray & 
Theisen, 1990, question #83). 
Unit norms related to retention/attrition appear not to have been included in the 
surveys of US AR attrition administered to date. For example, how do the TPU's members (not 
simply the officers) view the acceptability of missing drills? Under what circumstances is it seen 
as OK (advance notice given, make-up drill attended, only in emergencies)? This appears to be 
a potentially important sociological factor which needs to be included in future unit-level 
research on retention/attrition. 
VI.      FEEDBACK EFFECTS 
As noted earlier, the main causal effects in the model in Figure 1 are assumed to be from 
left to right. Thus, unit conditions have a causal influence on retention. Predictive studies, such 
as the Westat study (Perry et al., 1991), confirm this causal direction.  However, there are also 
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feedback effects from unit retention to those unit conditions that cause it.  For example, longer 
lengths of service in the company make it easier for company clerks to master their pay/benefits 
paperwork.  Longer periods of time together also tend to increase group cohesiveness and trust 
levels.   As experience levels increase, likewise, it becomes easier to conduct advanced (and 
more satisfying) training. 
This reciprocal influence, between unit-level retention and the unit conditions in the 
model, implies that high (and low) levels of retention can create a self-reinforcing cycle in units- 
-an upward or downward spiral.   Directing this spiral upwards, then, is a key, high-leverage 
strategy in improving unit readiness. 
VII.     LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR 
Leadership is a multidimensional entity. One key distinction is between the goals of 
leadership and the behaviors that leaders engage in to try to reach those goals. In the model, 
the unit conditions discussed above (and shown in Figure 1) are proposed as leadership goals 
with respect to retention. That is, the evidence suggests that leaders who wish to increase 
retention in their TPU should commit to creating those conditions. Again, working backwards, 
the leadership behavior portion of the model tries to identify specific behaviors that help produce 
those conditions. 
A.       A Methodological Note 
There is not a great deal of evidence on specific leadership behaviors related to 
retention/attrition in the USAR. In general, this area needs more research attention. Here, it 
seems useful to point out one methodological issue that is involved in such research-both as a 
way of partially explaining why there is little existing evidence and of identifying a strategy for 
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future research.7 
In the model, unit conditions are intervening variables in the causal path between 
leadership behavior and retention. If the model is accurate, then, attrition is directly influenced 
by unit conditions, and only indirectly influenced by leadership behavior (via their effects on unit 
conditions). A consequence of this is that unit conditions should have much stronger correlations 
with attrition than leadership behavior would have.  In fact, if the model were totally accurate, 
leadership behavior would have no significant effect on retention after accounting for the effects 
of unit conditions.   This means that in the typical study using correlation and regression to 
identify the most significant influences on attrition, leadership behaviors will tend not to show 
up as dominant or significant predictors.    In the Westat analysis (Perry et al, 1991), for 
example, a number of leadership behaviors were significantly correlated with actual staying vs. 
leaving, but failed to achieve significance after the unit conditions in Table 3 had been entered 
into the discriminant function.   Those behaviors include: the immediate supervisor setting an 
example, the immediate supervisor training soldiers as a team, officers spending enough time 
with the troops, and NCO's spending enough time with the troops. 
The implication from these results is not that leadership behavior is relatively 
unimportant in attrition.   Leadership behavior, after all, is what the leader can do to build the 
conditions that improve retention. The implication is that other statistical techniques are needed 
for this type of research.  Path analysis, for example, would do a better job of spelling out the 
sequences or networks of causal relationships between the variables in the model. Experimental 
studies would provide the ultimate evidence for the role of leadership behaviors-for example, 
7For other methodological suggestions for attrition research, 
see Laurence, Naughton and Harris (1995). 
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using educational interventions to alter leadership behaviors in selected TPU's and then tracking 
their effects upon retention in those units. 
B.       Contemporary Leadership Theory 
Although there is not much available research on leadership behavior and attrition 
in the Army Reserve, the larger body of research on leadership provides some working 
hypotheses that deserve testing in the USAR. Two important areas of research involve what 
have been termed "transactional" and "transformational" leadership. 
Transactional leadership constitutes a huge body of research on the extent to which 
the leader emphasizes task and people issues in his relations with subordinates.8 Task-oriented 
behavior, called "initiation of structure" in the most heavily researched theory (developed at 
Ohio State), involves the extent to which the leader initiates work activity in the work group, 
organizes it, and defines how it is to be done. People-oriented behavior (called "consideration" 
in that theory) involves various ways of expressing concern for the welfare of work group 
members-such as expressing appreciation for good work, being easy to approach, emphasizing 
the importance of job satisfaction, building subordinates' self-esteem, and listening to and 
implementing subordinates' suggestions. 
In general, the effects of these behaviors have been found to depend upon 
organizational setting. However, studies in the Active Component of the US Army (Marsh & 
Atherton, 1981-81) and in the US Army National Guard (Horn, 1979; Katerberg & Horn, 1981) 
consistently show that subordinates' perceptions of high leader initiation of structure and high 
leader consideration are both predictive of subordinates' satisfaction.    Horn (1981) further 
8For an extensive review of this literature, as well as some 
material on transformational leadership, see Bass (1990) 
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reports that high perceived levels of both behaviors were related to higher reenlistment rates in 
the National Guard.   With respect to the Army Reserve studies reviewed above, the Westat 
findings  (Table  3)  regarding perceived  leader   "helpfulness"  appear consistent with the 
importance of leader consideration.   Further research seems required on the contribution of 
leader's initiation of structure to retention in the US AR, although it seems to be a reasonable 
working hypothesis based on the other military findings. 
Transformational leadership involves the leader's ability to inspire subordinates 
with a compelling goal or purpose.9 Transformational leadership, then, is concerned with the 
leader's ability to set a direction and goal, and inspire subordinates to exert unusual levels of 
effort to reach it. The term, "transformational leadership," was coined by Burns (1978), who 
noted that transformational leaders were able to get subordinates to transcend their own narrow 
self-interests in the pursuit of higher ideals. A central theme in the contemporary literature on 
this topic is that transformational/inspirational leadership requires the articulation by the leader 
of a compelling vision of the group's goal-one which appeals to the values held by group 
members and will therefore be adopted and shared by them (e.g., Bennis & Nanus, 1985; 
Kouzes & Posner, 1987). 
Although most research on transformational leadership has focused on 
performance rather than attrition/retention, the company commander's use of a compelling vision 
for the command would seem to be an important contribution to the unit conditions that 
9The concept of "transformational leadership," as originally 
proposed by Burns (1978) in the context of presidential leadership, 
has been developed in recent management research under different 
labels--transformational, inspirational, and charismatic. The term 
is used generically here to include this larger set of labels. 
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contribute to retention.  Most reservists believe that the USAR performs an important readiness 
mission for the US, and service to country is a frequently cited reason for joining (Table 2). 
Even the attritees surveyed in the 1988 TPU Attritee Research Project (Bray & Theisen, 1990) 
tended to report high levels of pride in the USAR (question 61) and a strong belief that the 
USAR is essential to the defense of the U.S. (question 122).   Thus, there is a strong pool of 
idealism in the TPU surrounding the mission of the USAR. 
Adopting a clear, compelling vision for the TPU, phrased in terms of unit 
readiness to carry out its mission on behalf of the U.S., then, would appear to tap the ideals of 
TPU members.   Such a vision could contribute considerably to satisfaction with training by 
contributing a clear purpose.   As Thomas and Tymon (1993) note, work tasks (e.g., training) 
are  composed  of activities  directed  toward  purposes.      A  compelling  vision  provides 
meaningfulness of purpose, and a direction in which to measure progress.   Without such a 
purpose, training can become simply going through the motions (meaningless activities). 
Providing such a vision may also be one of the behaviors that builds trust in leaders.   Finally, 
having a shared, meaningful purpose, is likely to make a strong contribution to unit cohesion. 
Thus, there appears to be sufficient reason to adopt the working hypothesis that creating a 
compelling vision for the unit will tend to contribute to the conditions that increase retention. 
Along these lines, note that "orientation to the unit mission done well at in-processing" was a 
significant predictor of actual staying vs. leaving in the Westat analysis (Table 3). 
C.       Competencies and Best Practices 
The leadership literature has tended to focus on leadership "style"-which seems 
to reflect the general emphasis of the leader, rather than concrete behaviors or skills.   Going 
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beyond style, the framework developed for this project also identifies competencies and best 
practices as important aspects of leadership behavior that shape attrition. 
Leadership competencies were mentioned a number of times in interviews 
conducted by the author.    Planning (for training) stood out as a strong theme.    Positive 
reinforcement was also mentioned a number of times.  Coordination with other commands also 
appeared to play an important role in making training sessions work.   Time management also 
seemed important, given the high time demands on the company commander.  Also mentioned 
repeatedly was the ability to communicate with troops. 
Leadership best practices are procedures or programs developed or adapted by the 
command to try to contribute to the unit conditions affecting retention.  Several stand out from 
interviews: conducting makeup drills for reservists with scheduling conflicts on drill weekends, 
sponsoring Christmas and other activities that involve spouses and families in TPU activities, 
outreach programs to involve civilian employers, and programs to contact all reservists before 
the drill weekend to ensure attendance and provide needed transportation. 
VIIL   SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
The model recognizes that some of a unit's retention level can be explained by situational 
factors that are relatively objective and independent of leadership.  Different types of units (for 
example,  medical vs.  military police) may yield  significantly different retention levels. 
Geographic location (for example, rural vs. urban) may likewise influence retention. Likewise, 
characteristics of the unit's personnel (male vs. female, average years of service, etc.) will exert 
a significant influence on retention levels.   A separate research effort is currently underway at 
the Naval Postgraduate School to systematically test for the effects of these and other situational 
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factors on unit-level retention.10  Results of that study will provide more definitive inputs for 
this portion of the model. 
In the model, these situational factors are shown as shaping retention through their 
influence on unit conditions. For example, type of unit is likely to influence the meaningfulness 
of the training. However, it is also quite possible that these situational factors shape retention 
through variables that are outside the unit (for example, labor market conditions and bonuses for 
different Military Occupational Specialty categories) and therefore exogenous to the model. 
With respect to leadership, this portion of the model implies that unit commanders will 
be handicapped or aided in their efforts to control retention by situational factors over which 
they have no control.   Methodologically, it implies that studies of the effects of leadership 
behavior upon unit-level attrition will need to control for the effects of situational factors. 
IX.      NEXT STEPS IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
Phase I of the project has culminated in the development of the framework presented in 
this report. Phase II will take the framework the next step by identifying leadership behaviors 
that contribute to TPU retention. The basic strategy for this research is to identify units that are 
unusually high (or low) in retention, and then to conduct qualitative interviews to learn what 
leadership behaviors by the TPU commander are seen as contributing to (or reducing) attrition 
levels in the unit.11  More specific steps are as follow: 
"Professor George Thomas is principal investigator on this 
project, sponsored by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR). 
"Qualitative research is especially useful for discovering new 
knowledge (theory building), whereas quantitative research (e.g., 
with scaled questionnaires)  is more generally useful for the 
testing of previously derived knowledge (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
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1. Make use of current research, now being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
which is identifying situational factors that shape retention in TPU's. Using this research, 
identify a number of units in the Critical Force Pool that are substantially higher or lower in 
retention than would be predicted by those situational variables alone. 
2. Conduct interviews with a wide variety of individuals in each TPU (including the 
commander) plus the unit commander's superior. Attempt to identify any unit conditions, other 
than those listed in Figure 1, that are seen as contributing to high/low retention. (Ask 
specifically about unit norms relating to attendance.) Using this augmented list of unit 
conditions, ask each interviewee to identify aspects of the unit commander's style, competencies, 
and best practices that contribute to each unit condition. With interviewees' permission, tape 
record these interviews for later transcription. 
3. Review interview transcripts to identify patterns regarding leadership styles, 
competencies, and best practices that are seen as contributing to each unit condition. Add these 
findings to the framework in Figure 1. 
The findings of Phase II, in turn, will be used to generate policy recommendations. 
While it is not possible to anticipate the precise findings and recommendations at this point, it 
seems likely that some recommendations will involve education/training for new company 
commanders (and possibly for those transitioning from Active Component to Reserve Component 
units). They may also include selection and evaluation/feedback policies for company 
commanders. An important set of recommendations will also involve the dissemination and 
implementation of effective best practices identified by the study. Follow-up research priorities 
may also be identified, such as quantitative studies to test aspects of the new model, and/or field 
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experiments to test the effects of new policies upon attrition levels.  The latter seem especially 
important for verifying that any new policies (for example, training and implementation of best 
practices) have the desired effect upon unit-level retention. 
X.       SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       Summary 
This report has proposed a framework or model to serve as the foundation for an 
ongoing project to determine the role of TPU leadership in increasing unit-level retention. This 
model incorporates a comprehensive set of assumptions about the decision processes involved 
in reservists' retention/attrition behavior-incorporating economic, psychological and sociological 
dynamics. Drawing upon previous attrition research in the US Army Reserve, it identifies unit 
conditions in the TPU that significantly affect retention, using the various decision processes to 
explain how each set of conditions is believed to impact retention. There is sufficient 
convergence in the existing research evidence to place confidence in these unit conditions as 
significant influences upon attrition. The building of these conditions is proposed as a leadership 
goal for increasing retention. The model then attempts to identify key leadership behaviors that 
help to build these unit conditions (and thus increase retention). Here, there is less direct 
research evidence available, for which a methodological explanation was offered. Some working 
hypotheses regarding leadership style and retention were derived from the broader research 
literature, and attention was also drawn to the importance of leadership competencies and best 
practices. A research design for the next phase of this project was described to yield more 
definitive information on the leadership behaviors (styles, competencies, and best practices) that 
contribute to TPU unit retention. 
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The model proposed in this report (outlined in Figure 1) is a framework that 
organizes present knowledge regarding leadership and attrition in TPU's, and identifying missing 
knowledge to be provided in Phase II of the research project. Thus, it is very much a work in 
progress. However, enough reliable information is captured in the model now to recommend 
some use in its present form: 
1. Recommend that the model be incorporated into education/ training for 
company commanders and higher level officers. 
2. Recommend that the "unit conditions" aspect of the model be used as an input 
into development of diagnostics for TPU's. The staff of the Readiness Office, Critical Force 
Pool (CFP), US Army Reserve Command is already performing diagnostics for units showing 
high attrition levels. This model is offered as additional information for their work-and for 
units outside the CFP. 
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